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This paper examines, within an imperfectly competitive environment with 
public goods, the welfare effects of three popular indirect tax reforms: i) a tariff cut 
combined with an equal increase in the consumption tax, ii) a tariff cut combined with 
an increase in the consumption tax that leaves consumer price unchanged, and iii) an 
export tax reduction combined with an equal increase in the production tax. It is 
shown that the welfare effects of these reforms are ambiguous, in that they depend on 
the strength of the consumers’ valuation of the public goods. This result contrasts 
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The welfare and revenue effects of indirect tax reforms have received considerable 
attention by both academics and policy advisors.
1 The main result of the theoretical 
literature in a perfectly competitive environment has been that reductions in tariffs 
(export taxes) combined with increases in consumption taxes (production taxes) 
improve welfare and government revenues (see, among others, Hatzipanayotou et al. 
1994, Keen and Ligthart 2002, and Emran 2005). The reason for this is intuitive: A 
reduction in the tariff and an increase in consumption tax that keeps consumer price 
unchanged results in a more efficient allocation of resources, thereby improving 
welfare. Similarly, an export and production tax reform that keeps producer price 
unchanged improves consumption efficiency, by reducing excessive consumption of 
the exportable goods. The increase in revenues stems from a reduction in (implicit) 
production and consumption subsidies, respectively.      
More recently, attention has turned to imperfectly competitive markets. Keen 
and Ligthart (2005), henceforth KL, analyse two reform policies under imperfect 
competition. The first one is a tariff reduction with one-for-one increase in 
consumption taxes, whereas the second one is a tariff reduction with a point-by-point 
consumption tax increases that leaves consumer prices unchanged. They show that 
unilateral coordinated tariff-tax reforms of the above type unambiguously reduce 
national welfare. The intuition behind this result is that a reduction in the import tariff 
that is combined with an increase in the consumption tax shifts rents from the 
imperfectly competitive domestic firm to the foreign firm. As a consequence, a tariff-
tax reform that leaves consumer price unchanged decreases national welfare, since the 
adverse impact on domestic profits would more than offset increases in government 
revenue.
2  
Intermediate goods have also received some attention. Mujumdar (2004) 
considers an imperfectly competitive market with tradable intermediate goods and 
examines the welfare effects of a reduction of an import tariff on an intermediate 
input that is combined with a change in the profit tax. In this framework, tariff 
reductions in intermediate goods have favorable effects on the domestic firm’s profits 
                                                 
1 Such reforms are widely used in the structural adjustment and stabilization programs of the IMF and 
World Bank.  See, for example, Rajaram (1994), and  IMF (2005).  
2 A tariff reduction combined with a one-for-one increase in the consumption tax reduces national 
welfare as well. In this case, except for the adverse rent shifting effect there is another negative effect 
on national welfare through the reduction of the consumer’s surplus.     
  1and consumer surplus. More specifically, if the industry is a monopoly the 
government can rely on profit taxation to make up any shortfall in tariff revenue, 
while ensuring higher welfare for both consumers and producers. This result occurs 
because the larger the number of firms in the industry, the smaller is the increase in 
the industry’s profit following the tariff reduction. Haque and Mukherjee (2005) show 
that if products are differentiated then the government could use the profit tax to make 
up any shortfall in tariff revenue, for any finite numbers of firms in the industry.  
More recently, Abe and Naito (2008) have extended the analysis of KL by 
accounting for imported intermediate goods, and examine the welfare and revenue 
effects of tariff and consumption tax reform policies when tariffs apply not only to the 
final goods but also to the intermediate goods. They show that, under plausible 
conditions, reform policies that reduce the total tax burden on the intermediate good, 
while either leaving the total tax burden on the final good unchanged or changing the 
total tax burden on the final good so as to keep government revenue neutral, increase 
national welfare.  
Though the aforementioned contributions are insightful, their insights may not 
apply to a more general framework where government revenues, instead of being 
returned as a lump-sum fashion to the consumers, are used to finance the provision of 
public goods. And this is precisely the objective of this paper. In particular, this paper 
askes: Do the welfare reducing effects of unilateral indirect tax reforms hold if the 
revenues are used to provide for a local public good that confers utility to the 
consumers?
3  
More specifically, this paper examines the welfare implications of indirect tax 
reforms, in the context of an international duopoly with a domestic and a foreign firm, 
when the entire tax revenue is used to finance the provision of a public good. In this 
framework, the home country’s structure of indirect taxes consists of domestic taxes 
(consumption and production taxes), and trade taxes (imports tariffs and export taxes) 
and considers three types of indirect tax reforms: i) a tariff cut combined with an 
equal increase in the consumption tax, ii) a tariff cut combined with an increase in the 
consumption tax so as to leave the consumer price unchanged, and iii) an export tax 
                                                 
3 Public goods under imperfect competition have not been neglected in the literature. See, for instance, 
Neary (1994) who considers the asymmetries between private and social cost of funds in the context of 
strategic trade and industrial policy. A similar approach is taken by Keen and Lahiri (1998), 
Kotsogiannis and Lopez-Garcia (2007) and Haufler and Pflüger (2007), in the context of the 
comparison between destination and origin principles, tax harmonization and commodity tax 
competition, respectively.      
  2cut combined with an equal increase in the production tax. It is shown that these trade 
and tax reforms can be welfare improving, if the consumers’ valuation for the public 
good is sufficiently high to offset any welfare loss arising from the reduction of 
consumer surplus and the domestic firm’s profits.  
The structure of the paper is the following. Section 2 describes the model. 
Section 3 examines the welfare effects of the three coordinated trade-tax reforms, 
while Section 4 summarizes and provides some concluding remarks. 
 
2. The model      
The model is that of KL, appropriately extended to incorporate  a local public good 
and an additional policy reform of export and production taxes.  
The world consists of two countries, called ‘‘home’’ and ‘‘foreign’’, and two 
tradable commodities. The first commodity is produced under conditions of constant 
returns to scale and perfect competition. This good is assumed to be untaxed by both 
countries, and is taken to be the numeraire (with its price being normalized to 1). The 
other good is a homogeneous good and is produced by two imperfectly competitive 
firms, one in each country.  X ( ) denotes the quantity produced by the home 
(foreign) firm for domestic consumption, and Y (
* Y
* X ) denotes the home (foreign) 
firm’s exports. Aggregate consumption in the home market is, thus, 
* X X + , and 
aggregate consumption in the foreign market is 
* YY + . It is assumed that the two 
firms have identical linear cost structures, with, in particular strictly positive fixed 
cost, denoted by  , and strictly positive marginal cost  .  There are no transportation 
costs. 
F c
The home country has four policy instruments at its disposal: i) a specific 
consumption tax, denoted by t, levied on domestic and foreign goods sold in the 
home country, ii) a tariff, denoted by τ , levied on home country imported goods, iii) 
a specific production tax, denoted by  , levied on the domestic sales of the home 
country firm and its exports to the foreign country, and iv) an export tax, denoted by 
s
ε , levied on home exported goods.
4  
Domestic and foreign country firm profits,  denoted by Π and   are, 
respectively, given by 
* Π
                                                 
4 In the analysis that follows, it is assumed that the government does not use all the available policy 
instruments simultaneously. 
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              () ( )
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where   and  ()




 denote the inverse demand functions for the home 
and foreign country, respectively. Necessary conditions for profit maximization are 
given by 
 
                ,     (3)  *
**
X 0,     0 X qX q s t c qX q t c τ ′′ Π = + −−−= Π = + −−−=
                ,                             (4)  *
** * * * * 0,     0 Y Y qY q s c qY q c ε ′ Π= + −−−= Π = + −=
 
where   and   are the derivatives of  0 q′ <
* 0 q ′ < ( )
* qX X +  and  ( )
** qYY + , 
respectively. Perturbation of (3) and (4) gives the effects of changes in domestic and 
trade taxes on the supply of  X , 
* X ,  ,   (the details of this are related in the 
Appendix), and in particular 
* Y Y
 
                          
* 11
( 2 ),    ( 2 )
33
dX dt d ds dX dt d ds
qq
ττ =− + =+ −
′′
                       (5) 




() ,      (
33
dY ds d dY ds d
qq
) ε ε =+ = − −
′′
.                                (6) 
 
The two equations in (5) state that, other things being equal, a higher consumption tax 
rate, i.e., , reduces both the domestic sales of the home country firm and exports 
of the foreign country to the home one by the same amount, while a decrease in the 
import tariff, i.e.,
0 dt >
0 dτ < , increases exports of the foreign country firm, at the rate 
* 23 dX d q τ ′ = , and reduces the home country production sold in the home country 
at the rate  13 dX d q τ ′ =− . The implication of the latter result is that a lower τ  
increases total consumption, 
* X X + , in the home country. Additionally, a higher 
production tax, i.e., , reduces domestic production sold in the home country 
market at the rate 
0 ds >
23 dX ds q′ = , and increases foreign exports at the rate 
* 13 dX ds q′ =− . 
  4The two equations in (6) state that a higher production tax i.e.,  reduces 
home country exports, and increases foreign country production sold in the foreign 
country market. Lastly, a decrease in the export tax i.e.,
0 ds >
0 dε <  increases home 
exports and decreases foreign production sold in the foreign market. 
The government in the home country uses all its revenues to finance a publicly 
provided good, denoted by  ,  the unit price of which is equal to one. With 
consumption tax revenue  , production tax revenue 
g
* ( tX X + ) ) ( sX Y + , tariff revenue 
* X τ  and export tax revenue  Y ε , the quantity of the public good is given by 
 
                             
* () ( ) gt XX s XY X Y
* τ ε =+++ ++ .                                           (7) 
 
Home consumers derive utility  ( ) g Φ  from the public good,  () q ν  from the 
private good and Π from domestic profits. Overall, then, the utility or welfare of 
consumer is given by
5
                       




                                      ,                                                 (9)                              () g dW v q dq d dg ′ =+ Π + Φ
                      
          
 
where  . Equation (9) is central in the analysis that follows.  gg g Φ > > Φ 0
Notice that the indirect utility from the private good is equal to 
() () ()() qu D q q D q ν =− ,
6 which is the consumer’s surplus, and after making use of 
the fact that  ( ) () uD q q ′ =  and the market clearing condition 
* DXX = +  yields 
                        
                              .                                                    (10)  ()
* () vq d q X Xd q ′ =− +
 
                                                 
5 It is worth noticing that this specification departs from issues of cross-ownership of the home 
consumers owning (all or part of) the foreign firm.   
6  denotes the domestic demand for the (homogeneous) good.  () Dq
  53. Indirect Tax Reforms and Welfare 
This section considers how the three coordinated trade and tax reforms affect the 
welfare of an imperfectly competitive economy when tax revenues, are used to 
finance the provision of a public good. 
The first two cases examine only tariff-tax reforms by assuming that export and 
production taxes are zero, i.e., 0 ε = ,  0 s = . The first reform considers a tariff cut 
combined with an equal increase in the consumption tax (i.e.,dt dτ = − ), whereas the 
second examines a tariff cut combined with an increase in the consumption tax so as 
to leave the consumer price unchanged ( i.e.,dt dτ ≠ −  and  0 dq = ).
7 Finally, the last 
reform considers an export tax reduction combined with an equal increase in the 
production tax.  
 
3.1 A tariff cut combined with an equal increase in the consumption tax. 
Suppose that the policy reform is of equal but opposite magnitude in the consumption 
tax and import tariff in the sense that dt dτ = − . In this case equation (5) becomes 








,    (11) 
implying
8 a reduction in the sales of the home country firm by   and an increase 
the sales of the foreign firm (in the home country) by 
2/3q′
1/3q′ − . Perturbing 
 and making use of (5) it is the case that   (
* qq XX =+ )
 
                                     
* (1 3) dq q dX q dX dt ′′ =+ = ,                                                (12) 
 
and so the consumer price is increased. Substituting now (12) into (10) one obtains 
 
                                        ()
* () ( 1 3 ) vq d q X X d t ′ =− + <0
                                                
. (13) 
 
Equation (13) shows that this reform affects welfare negatively by reducing consumer 
surplus. It also reduces the home country firm’s profits due to adverse rent shifting 
 
7 Though in a perfectly competitive environment these two policy reforms are equivalent under 
imperfect competition they are not. 
8 Notice that since the consumption tax and import tariff are levied on domestic and foreign goods sold 
in the home country i.e.,
* X X + , the sales in the foreign country i.e.,
* YY +  are not affected. 
  6i.e., (4 3 )( ) 0 dq q t c d t ′ Π= − − < , since it increases imports and reduces sales of the 
domestic firm. Finally, perturbing equation (7) and setting dt dτ =− , yields 
[ ] (1 3)3 ( ) dg q q t c t dt τ ′ =− −− + − . Hence, this tariff-tax reform increases 
government revenue unambiguously if  t τ > ; that is if the tariff rate is initially higher 
than the consumption tax.  
Substituting (the differentials of)  (1) and (7), the equations (11)-(13) and 
dt dτ =−  in equation (9), and after some straightforward manipulations, one obtains 
 
                       
1
(1 ) ( 3 4 ) 3
3
g dW t dt
q





where  ( qt c τ Δ≡ − − − > .
9 Close inspection of equation (14) shows that this type 
of indirect tax reform may increase or decrease the home country’s welfare. Clearly, 
such ambiguity arises from the presence of the public good. If, for instance,  g Φ  is 
sufficiently greater than unity (arguably the most likely case)
10 and  t τ >  (at the initial 
equilibrium), then this policy reform will be welfare increasing. In particular setting 
, there is a threshold value of  0 dW = ˆ (6 5 )/(3 4 ) g t ττ Φ =Δ + Δ + −  above which 
welfare increases (where  ). If, on the other hand,  ˆ 1 g Φ> 1 g Φ =  which is equivalent 
to a lump sum redistribution of tax revenues in the existing literature, then this reform 
decreases welfare. The latter case reconfirms the result in KL, but it does so in an 
economy with public goods. Summarizing the above discussion:  
 
Proposition 1. In the presence of public goods, the welfare implications of a small 
tariff cut combined with an opposite change in the consumption tax (of the same 
absolute magnitude) are ambiguous. The welfare effect will be positive if i) the 
consumer’s valuation of the public good is sufficiently strong in the sense that 
ˆ
g g Φ> Φ, and ii) the tariff rate is initially higher than the consumption tax,  t τ > .    
                                                 
9 We assume that both firms are active in the initial equilibrium, for which, following (2), it is required 
that 0 qt c τ −−− > .  
10 Keen and Lahiri (1998), and Lahiri and Nasim (2005) offer empirical evidence for the value of  g Φ  
that is higher than unity.    
  7Proposition 1 clearly shows that, interestingly, the effect of this policy reform 
on welfare is, in general, ambiguous
11 when tariff and tax revenues are used to 
finance the public good. This is in contrast to the case where government revenues are 
returned to the consumers as a lump sum transfer. 
 
3.2 A tariff cut combined with an increase in the consumption tax so as to leave the 
consumer price unchanged. 
Following this reform, it is the case that 
* 0 dq q dX q dX ′′ = += , which implies, after 
using (5) that  2 dd t τ =− . Making use, then, of equation (5) one obtains 
 






.                                                       (15) 
 
Equation (15) simply says that a tariff-tax reform policy that leaves the consumer 
price unchanged decreases the sales of the domestic firm in the home country  by 1 q′ 
and increases the foreign country sales in the home country by the same amount. 
Therefore total consumption in the home country remains unchanged. 
Substituting the differentials of (1), (7), equations (10) and (15), and  2 dd t τ =−  
into equation (9), the welfare effect of this policy reform is given by  
 
                                    
* 2
(1 ) g dW q X dt
q
τ ′ ⎡ ⎤ =− + Φ − ⎣ ⎦ ′
.                                           (16) 
 
Equation (16) shows that, in this case too, the welfare implications of this policy 
reform critically depend on the presence of the public good and are ambiguous in 
sign. Such ambiguity has a simple intuition. The tariff-tax reform affects the home 
country’s welfare through the change in consumer surplus, profits, and public good 
provision. Since this reform holds the consumer price constant, the consumer surplus 
                                                 
11 It is possible to construct numerical examples which show that this reform can lead to either welfare 
improvement or welfare reduction. For instance suppose the inverse demand function has the form 
Da q β =− . Then, for parameter values,  10, 0.9, 4, 1.3, 3, 1 g ac t β τ = == Φ == =  one finds 
0 dW dt < , while for parameter values  10, 0.9, 4, 1.6, 3, 1 g ac t β τ = == Φ == =  one finds 
0 dW dt > . 
  8remains unchanged. The implication of this reform is to reduce the profits
12 of the 
home country firm and increase government revenues.
13 If revenues were returned in 
a lump sum fashion to the consumers (as in the contribution of KL), the adverse 
implication for the home country firm’s profits would offset the gain from the 
increase in government revenues, and thus national welfare would be reduced. 
However, in the presence of public goods this is not the case, since revenues generate 
positive utility through public good consumption. It is, thus, the case that the welfare 
consequence of this reform depends, critically, on the consumer’s valuation of the 
public good. In particular, there is a threshold value  g qX ′ Φ= −  above which welfare 
increases. Summarizing: 
 
Proposition 2. In the presence of public goods a tariff-tax reform that leaves 
consumer prices constant has ambiguous effects on national welfare. The welfare 
effect will be positive if the consumer’s valuation of the public good is sufficiently 
high, in the sense that  g g Φ> Φ. 
 
Proposition 2 emphasizes that the desirability of a tariff-tax reform that leaves 
consumer prices constant depends on the use of government revenues. If, for instance, 
revenues are returned to consumers in a lump sum way (as in KL) then this reform is 
undesirable. But if consumers value the public good sufficiently,
14 then this reform is 
welfare enhancing.  
 
3.3 An export tax reduction combined with an equal increase in the production tax. 
Attention now turns to a reform that reduces the export tax and increase the 
production tax by the same amount.
15 In this case it is assumed that both the 
                                                 
12 The domestic firm’s profits are reduced i.e.,  20 dX d t Π =− < . 
13 In the second case of reform policy government revenues also increases, without the extra 
assumption regarding the import tariff and consumption tax rates i.e.,  (2 ) 0 dg q dt τ ′ = −> .   
14 We provide two numerical examples to show that this tariff-tax reform can affect the welfare both 
ways. For instance suppose the inverse demand function has the form Da q β = − . Then, for 
parameter values:  10, 1.5, 3, 1.5, 1, 1 g ac t β τ === Φ == =  one obtains  0 dW dt > , while for 
parameter values  10, 1.5, 3, 1.2, 1, 1 g ac t β τ === Φ == =  one obtains  0 dW dt < . 
15 For this type of reform, in a perfectly competitive environment, see, among others, Keen and Ligthart 
(2002), and Emran (2005). 
  9consumption tax and import tariff are zero i.e., 0 t = , 0 τ = . Since, in this case, 
ds dε =−  equations (5) and (6) become, respectively                  
 














,                                                  (17)               
                                        ,  0 dY =
* 0 dY = .                                                                (18) 
 
Equation (17) simply states that this indirect tax reform reduces the sales of the 
domestic firm in the home country by 23 q′ and increases home country imports by 
13 q′ − . Additionally, equation (18) indicates that the home country exports and the 
sales of the foreign country firm in the foreign country remain unchanged. Intuitively, 
an export tax reduction is offset by an equal increase in the production tax and thus, 
home country exports are unaffected. However, an increase in the production tax, that 
applies not only to home country exports but also to the sales of the domestic firm in 
the home country, reduces the sales of the domestic firm in the home country and 
increases exports of the foreign country firm.   
Using equations (17) and (18) in the differentials of inverse demand functions, 
one obtains                    
      
                                  
* (1 3) dq q dX q dX ds ′′ =+ = ,                                                   (19) 
                                   ,                                                         (20) 
** * * 0 dq q dY q dY ′′ =+ =
 
which show that the indirect tax reform while increasing the consumer price in the 
home country, it does not affect the foreign country consumer price. Substituting 
equation (19) in equation (10), one obtains the effect of this reform on consumer 
surplus 
 
                            ( )
* () ( 1 3 ) v q dq X X ds ′ =− + <0 .                                                   (21) 
 
Since an export and production tax reform increases the consumer price in the home 
country, it follows that it reduces the consumer surplus. The home firm’s profits are 
  10also reduced, i.e.,  (4 3) 0 dX d Π=− < s , since the sales of the domestic firm in the 
home market are reduced, while the home firm’s exports remain unchanged.  
Perturbing equation (7), after using (17), (18) and setting ds dε = − , gives          
      
                    [ ] (1 3 ) 3( ) 2 dg Xds sdX q q s c s ds ′ =+= − − − − .                                  (22) 
 
Equation (22) shows that an export tax reduction combined with an equal increase in 
the production tax has an ambiguous effect on government revenue. The first term in 
the right-hand-side of (22) is the direct effect of the policy reform on government 
revenue: A higher production tax, at constant levels of sales of the domestic firm in 
the home country market, increases government revenue. The second term in the 
right-hand-side of (22) is the indirect effect of the same policy and captures a 
reduction in government revenue due to lower sales of the domestic firm in the home 
country market, resulting from a higher production tax.  
Substituting the differentials of (1), (2), the equations (17)-(22), and ds dε =−  
in equation (9), and after some manipulations one obtains 
 
                [] {}
1
(1 ) 3 ( ) 2 3 ()
3
g dW q c s s q c ds
q
=− Φ − − − − − −
′
.                                (23) 
                         
Equation (23) shows that the welfare implications of an export tax reduction 
combined with an equal increase in the production tax are ambiguous in sign, when 
the entire tax revenue is used to finance the provision of a public good. In particular, 
the second right-hand-side term in brackets is unambiguously negative, while the sign 
of the first right-hand-side term in brackets is ambiguous and depends on the impact 
of this reform on government revenue. If revenues were returned in a lump sum 









< , that is this reform decreases welfare. However, if the net effect 
on government revenue of this reform is unambiguously positive (i.e., the direct effect 
dominates the indirect effect) and the consumer’s valuation of the public good is 
sufficiently large, then this reform increases national welfare. In particular, there is a 
  11threshold value  [ ] [ ] 6( ) 5 3( ) 2 g qc s qcs s Φ= − − −− −   above which welfare increases. 
Summarizing: 
 
Proposition 3. In the presence of public goods the welfare implications of an export 
tax reduction combined with an equal increase in the production tax are ambiguous. 
The welfare effect will be positive if i) the net  effect of this policy reform on 
government revenue is positive (i.e.,  0 dg ds >  in equation 22),   and ii) the 
consumer’s valuation of the public good is sufficiently strong in the sense that 
g g Φ> Φ  .   
 
The results of this paper highlight the importance of the role of public goods in 
the model. According to the existing literature, shifting from trade taxes to domestic 
consumption taxes would not be recommended in imperfectly competitive 
environments. However, the more realistic assumption of public good provision 
implies that this strategy can be welfare enhancing under plausible conditions. These 
results strengthen the arguments in favor of the implementation of such reforms in 
developing countries.  
 
5. Concluding remarks 
This paper has investigated the welfare implications of three types of unilateral 
indirect tax reforms, within an imperfectly competitive framework with public good. 
It has shown that if tax revenues are used to finance the provision of a public good, 
then the welfare effects are ambiguous in general. In particular, if the consumers’ 
valuation of the public good is higher than specific thresholds then the policy reforms 
will be welfare improving; otherwise they will be welfare reducing as in the existing 
literature. 
The recognition of the use of government revenues has important policy 
implications. Take, for instance, the trade-tax reforms implemented in many 
developing countries under structural adjustment and stabilization programs of the 
IMF and World Bank. Clearly, the lack of the expenditure side of the public revenues 
(as in the contribution of KL) may render these indirect tax reforms as welfare 
reducing. But with public goods, as shown in this paper, this might not be the case. 
  12APPENDIX 
Derivation of equation (5) in the main text. 
 
Perturbing the system in (3) for an arbitrary change in import tariff and domestic 
taxes, after using   yields 
* dq q dX q dX ′′ =+
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After simple manipulations one obtains 











− ⎛⎞ ⎛⎞ ⎜ = ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎜ ′ − ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠ ⎜⎟
⎝⎠
⎟
⎟    (A2) 
Therefore, 




















Derivation of equation (6) in the main text. 
 
Perturbing the system in (4) for an arbitrary change in export and production taxes, 
after using 
** * dq q dY q dY ′ ′ =+ one obtains: 
 









′′ ⎛⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛⎞ ⎛⎞
=+ ⎜⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ′′ ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠ ⎝ ⎠
                                           (A3) 
 
 
After simple manipulations we have: 
 





d dY q ε
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,    
33
dY ds d dY ds d
qq
ε ε =+ = − −
′′
.        
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